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Before the  
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  
Washington, D.C. 20554

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

In the Matter of	)	
	)	
Federal-State Joint Board on	)	CC Docket No. 96-45
Universal Service	)	
	)	
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review –	)	CC Docket No. 98-171
Streamlined Contributor Reporting	)	
Requirements Associated with Administration	)	
of Telecommunications Relay Service, North	)	
American Numbering Plan, Local Number	)	
Portability, and Universal Service Support	)	
Mechanisms	)	
	)	
Telecommunications Services for Individuals	)	CC Docket No. 90-571
with Hearing and Speech Disabilities, and the	)	
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990	)	
	)	
Administration of the North American	)	CC Docket No. 92-237
Numbering Plan and North American	)	NSD File No. L-00-72
Numbering Plan Cost Recovery Contribution	)	
Factor and Fund Size	)	
	)	
Number Resource Optimization	)	CC DOCKET No. 99-200
	)	
Telephone Number Portability	)	CC Docket No. 95-116

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COMMENTS OF SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC

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**Attachment 1: Comparison of Current System and SBC Reform Proposal**

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Telephone Number Portability	)	CC Docket No. 95-116

**COMMENTS OF SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC.**

SBC Communications Inc. (SBC) hereby submits its comments in response to the Commission's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in this proceeding.<sup>1</sup> SBC contributes to the universal service fund as an incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC), as an interexchange carrier (IXC), and as a competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC). In these comments, SBC discusses its proposal for streamlining and reforming the Commission's assessment of carrier

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<sup>1</sup> *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service et al.*, CC Docket Nos. 96-45 et al., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 01-145 (rel., May 8, 2001) (*NPRM*).

universal service fund contributions and the mechanism for carriers to recover contribution costs from their end-user customers.

## **I. Introduction and Summary**

In the *NPRM*, the Commission focuses on two important issues related to the federal universal service fund: (i) customer confusion and competitive issues caused by the lack of a uniform universal service contribution and recovery mechanism, and (ii) the difficulty of maintaining a stable universal service fund in light of a rapidly evolving telecommunications marketplace.<sup>2</sup> The Commission seeks comment on how these issues could be addressed by streamlining and modifying the current universal service methodologies.

SBC supports the Commission's goal of establishing a universal service contribution and recovery mechanism that is simple to administer and does not shift more than an equitable share of contributions to any class of customers.<sup>3</sup> It is crucial that the Commission take the opportunity in this proceeding to streamline and simplify both the process by which universal service contributions are assessed on carriers and the process by which carriers recover these contribution costs from their end-user customers. The lack of uniformity in the current system is undoubtedly confusing for customers, who are the ultimate benefactors (and usually the beneficiaries) of the universal service fund. The Commission also must ensure that the public policy program of collecting universal service funding cannot be manipulated by carriers seeking to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace. *Under no circumstances should end-user customers make decisions about their choice of telecommunications service provider based on*

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<sup>2</sup> *NPRM* at ¶ 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.* at ¶ 5.

*the amount of the carrier's universal service recovery charge, which is effectively a regulatory fee.*

Moreover, the importance and difficulty of maintaining a “specific, predictable, and sufficient”<sup>4</sup> universal service mechanism that also is technologically and competitively neutral<sup>5</sup> cannot be understated. Complex rules, by their very nature, create opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. Only by eliminating these opportunities and adopting rules that are competitively and technologically neutral can the Commission ensure that the amount of universal service support remains stable.

SBC proposes a number of changes that are designed to consolidate and simplify the Commission's universal service contribution and recovery mechanism.<sup>6</sup> *First*, the universal service contribution percentage should be calculated annually based on carriers' collected interstate end-user telecommunications revenues, rather than quarterly based on their gross-billed revenues. *Second*, an individual carrier's contribution should be determined by applying the contribution percentage to the carrier's collected interstate end-user telecommunications revenues for a given month, rather than by assessing a pre-determined contribution amount based on the carrier's historical revenues. *Third*, carriers that choose to recover their universal service contributions should be required to do so through a uniform line-item charge that corresponds to the prescribed contribution percentage. SBC's proposal eliminates many of the customer confusion, arbitrage and stability problems caused by the current system.

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<sup>4</sup> 47 C.F.R. § 254(b)(5).

<sup>5</sup> *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service*, CC Docket No. 96-45, Recommended Decision, 12 FCC Rcd 87, 101 (1996) (*Joint Board Recommended Decision*); see also 47 C.F.R. § 254(b)(4).

<sup>6</sup> See Attachment 1 hereto, Comparison of Current System and SBC Reform Proposal.

The Commission also should take action to expand the contribution base to ensure the ongoing stability of the universal service fund. In particular, the Commission should include cable modem and Internet protocol (IP) voice services in the contribution base, establish an interstate allocation for all CLEC access lines, and reexamine the wireless provider safe harbor in light of the growing use of wireless phones as a substitute for wireline long distance service. These changes will fulfill the statutory mandate of providing an adequate and stable source of universal funding, as well as a universal service mechanism that is more technologically and competitively neutral than the current mechanism.

The Commission should not create more complexity and opportunity for arbitrage by adopting a per-unit (*e.g.*, per-line or per-account) measure of universal service contributions. Use of a per-unit measure of universal service contributions would result in additional customer confusion and endless regulatory battles over the proper categorization of services. Because of the sheer magnitude of the dollars involved, the ongoing growth of the universal service fund, and the intense competition in most segments of the telecommunications industry, the reality is that some carriers would take advantage of ambiguities in the contribution rules to minimize or avoid their universal service obligations. A per-unit measure also would not produce a stable and predictable source of universal service funding in a rapidly changing telecommunications market.

## **II. The Commission Should Adopt a Uniform Contribution and Recovery Mechanism Based on a Percentage of Collected Revenues**

### **A. Problems Caused by the Current Universal Service System**

Under the current system of establishing a contribution factor, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC) divides current fund demands by historical interstate (including international) telecommunications end-user revenues that are regularly reported by the

industry. This quarterly contribution factor is applied to the quarterly gross-billed revenues reported by each carrier six months earlier in order to determine that carrier's funding obligation.<sup>7</sup> The carrier-specific funding obligation is then recovered from the carrier's current revenue base, with the Commission permitting carriers to recover these universal service liabilities from their customers.<sup>8</sup>

There is nothing wrong with the process of calculating the contribution factor by dividing universal service funding demands by historical interstate end-user telecommunications revenues reported by the industry. The problem is that carriers are assessed a pre-determined contribution amount based on historical revenues, but they must recover contribution costs from their ongoing revenue base. Because of the time lag built into the current contribution methodology, carriers must make an adjustment if they are to fully recover their contribution costs. For example, carriers with declining revenues must charge their end-user customers a higher percentage line item than the quarterly contribution factor in order to be made whole.<sup>9</sup> As an ILEC that is losing access lines, SBC has been put in the position of under-recovering its universal service contributions because such contributions are tied to historical revenue data.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service and Petition for Reconsideration Filed by AT&T*, CC Docket No. 96-45, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, FCC 01-85, at ¶ 11 (rel. Mar. 14, 2001).

<sup>8</sup> 47 C.F.R. § 69.158.

<sup>9</sup> The only circumstance in which the application of the quarterly contribution factor would result in exact recovery is in the unlikely event that the revenues used to calculate a carrier's obligation (prior year revenues) are equal to the revenues used to recover the obligation (current year revenues).

<sup>10</sup> While some IXCs have argued that the current contribution methodology may give a competitive advantage to the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) as new entrants in the long distance market, these IXCs conveniently ignore the fact that the BOCs are losing revenues to new entrants in the local market. *See NPRM* at ¶ 14. The scope of this revenue loss is illustrated

Moreover, SBC shares the Commission's concern regarding the lack of uniformity by which carriers have recovered their universal service obligations from their end-user customers. The Commission currently does not regulate the methods used by IXC's, CLECs and wireless providers to recover their universal service contributions from end-user customers, which opens the door to a wide variety of recovery methodologies. In the *NPRM*, the Commission noted that, while the contribution factor for fourth quarter 2000 was set at 5.6688%, the major IXC's imposed recovery line items that ranged from 5.9% to 8.6%.<sup>11</sup> This lack of uniformity is undoubtedly confusing to end-user customers, who are the ultimate benefactors (and often the beneficiaries) of the universal service fund.

Customers also have no assurance that the universal service line item they are paying relates to the contribution factor established by the Commission.<sup>12</sup> The Commission noted that some carriers appear to be recovering their universal service contributions only from certain classes of customers.<sup>13</sup> Given the complete discretion that carriers other than ILECs have in recovering their universal service contributions from end-user customers, it would be very easy for these carriers to shift a disproportionate share of universal service recovery to the least desirable customers. Indeed, an IXC could choose to recover the majority of its universal service contributions from residential customers and pass through *no* universal service contributions to preferred business customers. The end result is a distorted marketplace where customers may

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by the fact that SBC's total number of access lines declined by almost 2 million from 1999 to 2000.

<sup>11</sup> *NPRM* at ¶ 5

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*

<sup>13</sup> *Id.*



make decisions about their choice of telecommunications provider based on the amount of the carrier's universal service recovery charge.

True competitive neutrality of universal service recovery demands that the Commission apply equal standards and provide an equal amount of flexibility (or lack thereof) to all carriers, regardless of the type of service provided and the carrier's historical role in the marketplace. The only practical solution is to implement a uniform contribution and recovery mechanism that eliminates opportunities for arbitrage and gaming of the system. If the method by which universal service contributions are assessed on carriers is not changed, then reducing the discretion of carriers to adjust this percentage in establishing their line-item charges results in incomplete or inaccurate recovery of universal service obligations. There simply is no foolproof way to ensure a perfect match between contributions and recovery when two completely different revenue calculations are involved. Thus, the Commission is justified in implementing a uniform process for assessing and collecting what is effectively a regulatory fee, and this process will not affect carriers' ability to compete freely in the marketplace.

**B. SBC's Proposal for a Uniform Universal Service Contribution and Recovery Mechanism**

SBC proposes a methodology that consolidates and simplifies the contribution and recovery of universal service funding. *First*, the universal service contribution percentage should be calculated annually based on carriers' collected interstate end-user telecommunications revenues, rather than quarterly based on their gross-billed revenues. As the Commission recognized in the *NPRM*, the benefit of using collected revenues is that it factors out uncollectibles and credits from the allocation methodology.<sup>14</sup> The Commission need not modify

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<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at ¶ 25. If a carrier elects not to recover its universal service contribution costs from a customer, the carrier will still be obligated to apply the contribution factor to the interstate end-user revenues generated by that customer.

the formula that is used to set the contribution factor, but it should streamline the contribution process by changing the contribution factor only on an annual basis.

*Second*, an individual carrier's contribution should be determined by applying the contribution percentage to the carrier's collected interstate end-user telecommunications revenues for a given month, rather than by assessing a pre-determined contribution amount based on the carrier's historical revenues. By eliminating the carrier-specific funding obligation, carriers would not be constrained by having to recover a pre-determined amount. This proposal also would solve the problem of carriers under-recovering on their universal service contributions due to declining revenues, because the recovery "target" would no longer exist.

*Third*, SBC supports the Commission's proposal to require all carriers that choose to recover their universal service contributions to do so through a uniform line-item charge that corresponds to the prescribed contribution percentage.<sup>15</sup> The current system – which regulates the ILECs' recovery of universal service contribution costs and gives other carriers virtually unlimited discretion regarding their cost recovery method – leads to customer confusion and creates the potential for competitive manipulation of the universal service line item. Establishing a uniform percentage recovery method for universal service funding would result in the same type of flow-through mechanism that is already used to recover the excise tax.

SBC's proposal eliminates many of the customer confusion, arbitrage and stability problems caused by the current system. Calculating the contribution percentage on an annual basis will help to reduce customer confusion, and it will reduce the burden on carriers to make quarterly adjustments in their billing systems. The use of a contribution percentage also avoids the need for carriers to make an adjustment to their recovery mechanism in order to avoid under-

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<sup>15</sup> *Id.* at ¶ 42.

recovering their universal service contributions. Instead, the recovery process becomes a simple flow through for carriers and the customer confusion and arbitrage concerns caused by the wide variance of recovery mechanisms in use today are eliminated. In addition, all new entrants will apply the contribution factor to their revenues as soon as they enter the market, which eliminates any concern that new entrants may be able to gain a competitive advantage from the universal service collection mechanism.

Moreover, a uniform revenue-based contribution and recovery mechanism proposed will provide a sufficient and predictable source of universal service support. Because all carriers will apply the contribution factor to their interstate end-user telecommunications revenues uniformly and without discretion, the funding demands should be recovered by the industry within an acceptable level of precision. Any declining revenues experienced by one carrier will most likely be offset by a corresponding increase in revenues by a competing carrier. In fact, a revenue-based mechanism should produce surplus universal service contributions during a given year because industry revenues are generally increasing from year to year.<sup>16</sup>

### **C. A Transition Period is Needed to Implement a Uniform Recovery Method**

The modifications to the universal service contribution methodology proposed by SBC can and should be implemented immediately. In fact, it should greatly simplify the contribution process if carrier contributions are based on collected revenues and determined by applying the contribution factor to carriers' ongoing interstate end-user telecommunications revenues. Thus, a transition period is not needed to implement these changes.

However, SBC understands that the transition from various recovery methods (*e.g.*, the price cap LECs' per-line recovery) to a uniform revenue-based recovery method will require a

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<sup>16</sup> See *Statistics of Communications Common Carriers* at Table 5.12 (rel. Aug. 11, 2000).

significant and time-consuming modifications to billing and other systems. Though such systems changes may be extensive, SBC believes that implementation of a uniform mechanism for universal service contribution and recovery is a necessary component for ensuring the competitive neutrality and stability of the fund. It is important that the Commission allow ample time and opportunity for all carriers to design or modify billing and other systems in order to comply with these changes. SBC believes a transition time as long as nine months to a year will probably be needed to implement a uniform revenue-based mechanism for universal service recovery.

### **III. The Commission Expand the Contribution Base to Ensure the Ongoing Stability of the Universal Service Fund**

In addition to the changes described above, the ability of a uniform factor to generate sufficient revenues depends on the definition of a revenue base that will not erode as a result of the evolution of the telecommunications marketplace and the convergence of technology. The interstate revenue base is relatively stable when considered from the total industry perspective. In an ideal world, any dollar of interstate communications retail revenue would be treated identically regardless of the provider that earned it, but this is not currently the case. However, under the current system:

- A dollar earned by a provider of DSL service is treated differently than a dollar earned by a cable modem services provider (telecommunications service v. alleged “information” service).<sup>17</sup>
- A dollar earned by a provider of IP telephony is not treated identically to a dollar earned by a provider of traditional interexchange service,<sup>18</sup> and

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<sup>17</sup> *Id.* at n.45.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.* at n.44.

- A dollar of SLC revenue if earned by an ILEC is not treated identically to the equivalent dollar earned by a CLEC;
- A dollar earned by a wireless service provider is not treated identically to the same dollar if earned by a wireline carrier (wireless safe-harbor);<sup>19</sup>

If the Commission is concerned with maintaining the stability of the universal service contribution base, it must address these gaps of competitive and technological neutrality. As dollars flow outward from this revenue base, there necessarily will be a heavier reliance on the dollars (and the service providers that generate them) remaining in the system. In this sense, the narrowly tailored fashion by which universal service funding proceeds are generated have the ability to inefficiently pick the technological winners and losers in the marketplace. The Commission must address this situation and equitably distribute the universal service funding obligation so it is consistent throughout the industry -- a dollar earned by any carrier should generate an identical universal service obligation, regardless of provider, organizational structure, or technology.

#### **A. Cable Modem and IP Telephone Services**

The economic rationality of exploiting any available loopholes is most clearly illustrated by the fact that cable-modem and IP voice service providers do not currently contribute to universal service. Because these service providers claim to provide an “information service” rather than a “telecommunications service,” they are exempt from contribution obligations. However, at least one court has recognized that cable modem service providers are providing a telecommunications service, which means the service should be included in the universal service

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<sup>19</sup> *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service*, CC Docket No. 96-45, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd 21252, 21258 (1998).

contribution base.<sup>20</sup> The Commission must finally resolve the regulatory status of cable modem and IP telephone services so they do not continue to receive an unfair competitive advantage from the universal service mechanism.

#### **B. CLEC Access Lines**

Under the current system, a CLEC could avoid contributing to the universal service fund by electing to recover all of its costs from the intrastate jurisdiction or, until recently, by recovering equivalent amounts from IXCs through excessive access charges. In so doing, the CLEC would avoid assessing a charge similar to the interstate EUCL that ILECs must charge in order to fully recover their costs. As a result, it is impossible for the Commission to know how CLECs are calculating any contributions to the universal service fund. SBC is concerned that some CLECs may not be paying their fair share into the fund because they have complete discretion regarding how much (if any) interstate revenue they report.

To address this problem, SBC supports creating some type of mandatory allocation of interstate revenues for *all* access lines. The Commission could establish a safe harbor interstate allocation percentage for the exchange access component of each access line and give CLECs the option of performing a separations calculation to justify a different interstate allocation percentage. This will ensure that all CLECs contribute to the universal service fund.

#### **C. Wireless Safe Harbor Provision**

The Commission seeks input on whether changes in market conditions justify revising the current wireless safe harbor provision that requires wireless providers to report at most 15% of their wireless revenues.<sup>21</sup> To the extent that a wireless service provider can substantiate that the

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<sup>20</sup> See *AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland*, 216 F.3d 871 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000).

<sup>21</sup> *NPRM* at ¶ 21

interstate portion of their revenues is lower than 15%, they can report this lower figure.<sup>22</sup> As nationwide calling plans proliferate and wireless telephony continues to become a very real substitute for wireline telephony, wireless providers continue to capture an increasing share of total telecommunications minutes and the revenues that flow from these minutes of use.

SBC's concerns on this issue deals mostly with the competitive neutrality dimension and the dilemma of maintaining a stable universal service contribution base. In order for the universal service funding mechanism to be competitively neutral, it must treat revenues from substitutable services substantially similarly, if not altogether identically. The wireless safe-harbor provision dictates that this is not the case. Many wireless plans offer a predetermined amount of minutes for a flat, monthly fee with some plans bundling long-distance usage at no extra charge. These plans are very much a close substitute for the wireline versions of local and long distance service. However, even if a wireless provider were providing customers with mostly interstate minutes, the provider's universal service contribution base would be, at most, 15% of its revenues from the customer. Therefore, SBC urges the Commission to reexamine the wireless safe harbor in light of the market developments that have occurred.

#### **IV. The Commission Should Not Attempt to Base Universal Service Contributions on a Per-Unit Measure**

The Commission seeks comment regarding whether to continue to allocate funding obligations according to revenues or whether some other metric would result in a more appropriate allocation.<sup>23</sup> In particular, the Commission seeks comment on alternative methodologies involving flat per-unit (*e.g.*, per-line or per-account) measures.<sup>24</sup> SBC strongly

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<sup>22</sup> *Id.*

<sup>23</sup> *Id.* at ¶ 25.

<sup>24</sup> *Id.*

believes the current method of allocating universal service contributions according to revenues remains the most appropriate allocation method. Revenues are the only common denominator to the various types of carriers. If properly defined, this revenue metric is the only common factor that will survive unforeseeable developments of technology and economics.

When originally considering this issue, the Commission agreed with the conclusion of the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service (Joint Board) that an allocation according to revenues was preferable to flat “per unit” alternative methods that relied on the number of lines or minutes of use.<sup>25</sup> The Joint Board was opposed to the latter metrics because such a methodology would require that the Commission adopt and administer unwieldy “equivalency ratios” to calculate the universal service obligations of carriers that did not provide services on a per-line or per-minute of usage basis.<sup>26</sup> In rejecting these per-unit metrics, the Commission further reasoned that “these approaches are not competitively neutral because they may inadvertently favor certain services or providers over others if the “equivalency ratios” are improperly calculated or inaccurate.”<sup>27</sup>

More than four years later, there is still no reason for the Commission to attempt such a complicated endeavor. Just as the awkwardness and artificiality of such an allocation proxy was a problem in 1996, it remains a problem today. In the current *NPRM*, the Commission seeks comment on how relative weight might be apportioned among different types of lines for purposes of assigning carrier contributions. This determination would be fraught with difficulties. For example, to apportion relative weight between the various types of lines, the

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<sup>25</sup> See *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service*, CC Docket No. 96-45, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 8776, 9210 (1997) (*Universal Service Order*).

<sup>26</sup> *Joint Board Recommended Decision*, 12 FCC Rcd at 496.

<sup>27</sup> *Universal Service Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 9210.



Commission would have to analyze whether it is reasonable to apportion equal weight to residential-lines and T-1 lines. The Commission also would have to analyze whether the capability of DSL to simultaneously transmit voice and data must be treated as one line or two. Further, the Commission would have to consider whether or not a DSL-capable line where both the data and voice functionalities are activated should be given equal weight to a line where only one of the functionalities is activated.

The difficulty of resolving issues such as “functional equivalence” is illustrated by the ongoing debate about whether CLECs and wireless providers perform the equivalent of tandem switching in their networks. Carriers have spent years fighting about whether CLEC and wireless switches are the functional equivalent of ILEC tandem switches, and state commissions have come to different conclusions in resolving the issue. As this experience proves, the functional equivalence test would lead to endless regulatory battles and widespread regulatory arbitrage if a per-unit measure were adopted in the universal service context. Use of such an open-ended and pliable test contravenes the statutory requirement that universal service support be specific and predictable. If anything, customers would be far more confused and vulnerable to manipulation than under the current system, with all its flaws. Moreover, as the Commission recognized in the *NPRM*, the application of either a per-line or per-account methodology as a structure for collection of a regulatory fee may well be regressive for lower volume customers if broadly applied to all lines or accounts, especially those not capable of being utilized for interstate communications.<sup>28</sup>

The use of a per-line methodology also would be contrary to the statutory requirement of competitive neutrality, as it would be unduly biased towards carriers that rely on “lines” as a

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<sup>28</sup> *NPRM* at ¶ 29.

transmission medium. It also would lead to definitional battles over what constitutes a line. The definition of what constitutes a line or line equivalent would have to be broad enough to include wireless service providers, paging service providers, satellite service providers, IXCs, calling card and dial-around providers, and access-based CLECs. As the definition of a line became settled, it is inevitable that carriers would then be encouraged to develop technology that fell outside the bounds of such a definition. Similarly, as technologies converge, to rely on an allocator that is only utilized by some carriers as a transmission medium would be particularly myopic. Such a criterion would already be obsolete, thus requiring the Commission to engage in this same discussion again in the very near future.

Though more inclusive of various types of providers and seemingly more reasonable than a per-line methodology, a per-account allocation would have much of the same problems for competitive neutrality. A per-account allocation would invite carriers to engage in creative attempts to escape or mitigate their universal service liabilities. Just as the applicability of a per-line methodology has unclear implications for various types of providers, this criterion would create ambiguities for carriers to exploit. A per-account methodology would be difficult to apply to carriers that provide services without pre-subscription, such as calling card and dial-around service providers. Further, carriers could restructure contracts and consolidate services with large business customers in order to minimize their overall number of accounts. It is reasonably foreseeable that such an allocation would encourage the inefficient bundling of service offerings, thereby resulting in a reduction of consumer choice.

## V. Conclusion

SBC supports the Commission's effort to streamline and reform the current method of assessing contributions to the federal universal service fund and recovering contribution costs from end-user customers. As the Commission acknowledges in the *NPRM*, the current system creates customer confusion and the potential for competitive manipulation. SBC believes the best way to reform the system is to implement a uniform universal service contribution and recovery mechanism that is based on a percentage of collected revenues. Rather than billing carriers a pre-determined contribution amount based on their historical revenues, which forces carriers to make an adjustment to their recovery method if they wish to fully recover their contribution costs the Commission should simply collect a percentage of all carriers' interstate end-user telecommunications revenue. That same percentage can then appear on customer bills as a line item without any need for a mark-up. At the same time, the Commission should take steps to ensure the stability of the universal service fund by including cable modem and IP telephone services in the contribution base, requiring an interstate allocation for all CLEC access lines, and reexamining the wireless safe harbor.

Respectfully Submitted,



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## Attachment 1: Comparison of Current System and SBC Reform Proposal

	Current System	SBC's Proposal
<b>Setting the Contribution Factor</b>	Quarterly Funding Demands divided by Historical Gross-Billed Revenues	Annual Funding Demands divided by Historical Net-Collected Revenues
<b>Calculation of Carrier Contributions</b>	Quarterly Contribution Factor multiplied by Carrier's Historical Gross-Billed Revenues	Apply Annual Contribution Factor to Carrier's Current Net-Collected Revenues
<b>Method of Billing and Remittance</b>	Monthly Bills (based on historical gross-billed revenues) are issued by USAC and paid by the carriers	USAC no longer issue bills, and carriers each remit an amount that corresponds to their net-collected revenues multiplied by the contribution factor
<b>Recovery Mechanism for Carrier Obligations</b>	Various methodologies are utilized, with percentages that bear no relation to the contribution factor	Carriers that elect to recover will be required to pass along a uniform percentage, set equal to the contribution factor

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, Loretia Hill, do hereby certify that on this 25<sup>th</sup> Day of June, a copy of the foregoing  
“Comments” was served by hand delivery to the parties listed below.

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